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RURAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A 
SEMIARID AFRICAN COUNTRY 
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA 
LOUISE FORTMANN 
Environmental determinism has long been 
discredited in explaining the social organiza-
tion of pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples. I 
Today the effect of climate on social organiza-
tion is recognized as mediated by social, 
economic, and political factors. 2 Thus, social 
organization in Botswana reflects the influence 
of a wide variety of factors, among them 
Christian missionaries, interethnic warfare, 
past and continuing aggression of South 
Africa, introduction of the iron plow, British 
colonialism, Boer traders, discovery of miner-
als (most recently diamonds), international 
donor aid, and so on. Over the past century 
there have been substantial changes in a 
number of important trends: life expectancy, 
literacy, and per capita income have increased; 
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commercial agriculture has evolved; transpor-
tation and communication infrastructures 
have been radically improved; and urban 
centers and nonagricultural industry have 
been established. Furthermore, the advent of 
new technologies has in some ways and some 
places altered the effects of semiaridity and of 
drought. Hand-dug wells, dams, diesel engines, 
and water tankers have allowed the periodic 
substitution of labor and capital for rainfall. 
The cumulative impact of such technological 
innovation has been to change the social 
meaning of climate for many Batswana.3 
Yet, in the midst of this monumental 
change, some aspects of rural social organiza-
tion in Botswana have been remarkably stable. 
This article explores the proposition that their 
stability is partly due to the persistence of the 
need for household flexibility, regardless of 
this change and pressure for change. The 
intent is to remind readers of the kernel of 
truth in the theory of environmental deter-
minism: climate is one important independent 
variable influencing social organization. 
Four forms of social organization-the 
social organization of land tenure, water use, 
multiple residences, and village-level organiza-
tion-are examined. The context in which 
they function is described in the following 
discussions of the Botswana setting and of the 
need for flexibility in semiarid climates.4 
THE BOTSWANA CONTEXT 
Slightly larger than France, landlocked 
Botswana, with its population of 935,000, is 
located astride the Tropic of Capricorn, 
bounded by Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and 
the Republic of South Africa. Although the 
Okavango Delta in the north contains water 
year-round, most rivers and streams contain 
water only seasonally (see fig. 1). Most of the 
country is savanna with, in the north, large 
areas of mophane trees (Colophospermum mo-
pane), which provide fodder for cattle and act 
as a host for an edible caterpillar. Botswana 
was a British protectorate from 1885 to 1966. It 
became independent under the presidency of 
Sir Seretse Khama in 1966 and has remained a 
multiparty democracy. Its major export earn-
ings come from the sale of diamonds and 
cattle. 
Early travelers referred to Botswana's Kga-
lagadi Desert as the Great Thirstland, a rather 
vivid portrayal of its arid and semiarid qual-
ities. Nationally, mean annual rainfall is 
approximately 500 mm (20 inches), while 
actual rainfall varies from roughly 200 to 1000 
mm (8 to 40 inches) depending on the year and 
the place. ' Tyson (who predicted the present 
drought) found an approximately twenty-year 
oscillation in rainfall: ten wet years are fol-
lowed by ten dry ones with a few dry years 
interspersed among the wet ones and vice 
versa. An arable drought (in which crops but 
not livestock are lost) can be expected every 
four to five years. Rainfall itself is unreliable 
with extreme annual variations, tends to occur 
in heavy showers of short duration, and is 
highly unpredictable in anyone place or at 
anyone time. The average Motswana thus is 
faced with a difficult climate that is further 
complicated by wholly unpredictable rainfall. 
Most of the population lives in the rural 
areas, the vast majority being settled within 
100 kilometers of the railway line running 
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north-south in the eastern part of the country. 
The rural household production system is 
adapted to the semiarid climate through two 
types of land use-crop production and live-
stock production. Most rural Batswana live 
near reliable water in a village during the dry 
season and move out to a residence in the 
farming areas (hereafter referred to as the 
lands) as soon as the first rains fall and surface 
water can be trapped. The typical rural 
household in eastern Botswana farms two 
hectares of land (often located in scattered 
parcels in order to maximize the chance of 
some plots receiving rainfall) with an o~- or 
donkey-drawn plow. Generally sorghum (or, 
in better watered areas, maize), is the main 
crop, supplemented with watermelon and 
perhaps sunflowers or beans. A few chickens 
or small stock may be kept around the 
compound. Roughly 45 percent of the rural 
households hold cattle for plowing, milk, and 
savings. Wealthier households with larger 
herds may keep their animals at a third 
residence (often little more than a camp), 
called the cattlepost. Smaller herds and draft 
animals are typically kept at the lands. Needs 
for cash (to buy food, for instance) are often 
met by remittances from a household member 
who has obtained wage employment in the 
urban areas of Botswana or in South Africa as 
a miner or domestic servant. Cash may also be 
generated by selling livestock, crops, or fuel-
wood; by local casual employment; and by 
women's small enterprises, such as beer brew-
ing, basket weaving, handicrafts, and snack 
food sales. 
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FACE OF 
RESOURCE SCARCITY 
The most important factor for survival in a 
nonindustrial society in a semiarid climate is 
flexibility, that is, access to multiple means of 
obtaining resources. Historically, the house-
hold in Botswana had to be able to move to 
avoid or reduce hardship. There could not be 
total reliance on one place, one resource, or 
one mode of production. If a household or 
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FIG. 1. Republic of Botswana. Source: Charles Harvey, Ed. Papers on the Economy of Botswana. 
London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981. Frontispiece. 
village could not move when the times of 
climatic stress inevitably came, it would ex-
haust the resources around it. In the past, 
flexibility was achieved by moving to where 
the resources were. Today this flexibility can in 
part be obtained by bringing the resources to 
the village or the household (for example 
through relief in the form of food and/or 
employment or through the provision of water 
during drought) or by shifting dependence to a 
new resource such as urban wage employment. 
Whatever its specific form, flexibility remains a 
crucial strategy for survival in semiarid areas. 
For some Batswana part of this strategy for 
survival consists of limiting pressure on natural 
resources in order to increase the chance that 
there will always be a resource to fall back on. 
This is most readily accomplished by limiting 
access to the resource. Thus, in some cases, 
certain areas of rangeland are not used in the 
wet season in order to insure that they are 
available for use in the dry season. Similarly, 
certain water sources are reserved for dry 
season use in order to preserve a continuous 
supply of water throughout the year. Obvious-
ly, restricting use in order to preserve options 
in the time of stress necessarily limits options 
at any given time. This becomes complicated 
when more than one social unit lays claim to 
the same resource or set of resources. In such 
cases one group's management strategy may 
limit another group's flexibility. Or one group 
may try to preserve its own resource by using 
that of another group. Such cases are inevitab-
ly fraught with conflict. As we shall see, the 
ability to limit access to one's own resource is 
restricted by the need to maintain reciprocal 
relations with others in order to have access to 
local resources in time of need. 
Despite shifts in power among pre- and 
post-Independence elites, rural social organiza-
tion in Botswana has maintained a balance 
between achieving flexibility and limiting 
pressure on resources. For example, the local 
ability to reduce pressure on a resource 
through exclusion increasingly may be limited 
by the locus of decision making at national 
even international (in the form of donor 
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agencies) levels. Thus, flexibility has in some 
cases assumed even more importance recently 
that it has in the past. 
In summary, the most crucial factor in the 
adaptation of social structure to the climate is 
the maintenance of flexibility. Thus, changes 
in the social structure which reduce flexibility 
or allow flexibility to be maintained only at the 
expense of general equity are unlikely to be 
adopted.6 Conversely, those changes that do 
not interfere with general flexibility have a 
great likelihood of being adopted. 
LAND TENURE 
"Land is a very special resource, the very 
base on which the nation stands. The way 
in which it is administered is a profound 
expression of national values."-Presiden-
tial Commission on Land T enure7 
This section explores the theoretical trade-
offs between communal and private land 
ownership and the pressures to privatize land 
tenure in Botswana and discusses available 
data on the effects of private and communal 
property systems on environmental degrada-
tion in Botswana. Since flexibility is essential 
to survival and implies the ability to move, 
land cannot be held in a communal or private 
form that ties people to a fixed place. The 
strategies for obtaining flexibility adopted 
under conditions of private and communal 
land ownership can, in theory, be expected to 
differ. In the abstract, the private owner has at 
least three options for obtaining flexibility. 
One is to accumulate enough contiguous land 
to include fallback areas for all or major 
contingencies. In most semiarid regions this 
involves such large areas of land as to dispos-
sess others and to have severe effects on social 
equity. A second option is to acquire scattered 
parcels of land that include the necessary 
fallbacks. Such a plan is functional only if one 
and one's herds have both the right of transit 
across the land of others and access to the 
resources (water and grazing) that allow transit 
to take place. A third possibility is to make 
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arrangements to use the resources of neighbors 
when necessary. 
In contrast, under communal ownership 
the entire resource base is, in theory, available 
for use by all members of the social group, 
leaving everyone free to go to the resources. 
Traditional property rights provided flexibility 
for the whole community in Botswana.8 The 
chief, as head of the tribe, controlled all the 
land in his (or her, in the case of female 
regents) domain, assigning areas for residence 
and for farming to each ward in the capital. In 
turn, this land was assigned to individual 
households by ward heads. Households had 
private rights (which could be inherited, 
loaned, or given away but not sold) to 
residential and arable land and wells and 
dams. If land were abandoned, it reverted to 
the tribe and could be assigned to someone else 
by the chief or the ward head. Surface water, 
grazing, wild edible plants, clay, and other 
natural products were used in common, as was 
the crop residue left after harvest. 
Much of the traditional system of land 
tenure has been retained to the present day 
despite the numerous pressures toward change 
beginning with British and Boer imperialism, 
which entailed a variety of requests and 
demands for freehold title to land.9 A second 
pressure for change (continued by some post-
Independence donors) came from the officials 
of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, who felt 
that communal land tenure was incompatible 
with proper range management. 1O A third set 
of pressures is associated with the demand for 
secure collateral for bank loans. Many people 
believe that they cannot obtain a loan unless 
they obtain freehold title to their land. 
The fourth set of pressures is associated 
with the monetarization of the Botswana 
economy and the commercialization and in-
creasing profitability of the livestock sector in 
particular. The terms of trade have historically 
favored livestock over arable agriculture, a 
relationship that has been reinforced by an 
EEC program for the cattle industry under 
which Botswana producers have received 
above world market price for their cattle.1i As 
a result, some of the cattle-owning elite have 
tried various means of bringing grazing land 
under their exclusive control. The 1975 Tribal 
Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP), which estab-
lished long-term leases for private ranches, has 
been characterized by some observers as a land 
grab by the rich. Some entrepreneurs have also 
attempted both legally and illegally to control 
communal grazing areas for their own private 
use by various means, including the establish-
ment of private water rights. This has some-
times led to dramatic confrontations with 
communities whose land is being expropri-
ated. I ' 
The strength of the traditional land tenure 
system against these pressures was demon-
strated in the recommendation of the 1983 
Presidential Commission on Land Tenure that 
there be no "tenure changes in respect of 
arable and grazing land." The Commission 
noted that customary land tenure systems 
"already possess the important features of 
security of tenure, easy access to land and 
inheritability which can in fact encourage 
development. The people did not express any 
need for radical changes because they felt there 
is nothing wrong with the existing system."ll 
The Commission concluded that "Tenure 
change which could produce landlessness 
before other economic opportunities are gener-
ally available would clearly be ill-advised."14 
The staying power of the traditional land 
tenure system lies in its adaptation to the 
vagaries of the climate, its compatibility with 
other social institutions both modern and 
traditional, and the drawbacks of the much-
touted alternative of privatization. For exam-
ple, ]. Bruce has demonstrated that the 
traditional tenure system is compatible with 
the requirements of modern commercial lend-
ing institutions. I5 Financial institutions them-
selves testified before the Presidential Land 
Tenure Commission that "restrictions on the 
hypothecation of tribal land are not their main 
constraint on lending. "16 Thus the argument 
that capital-dependent development cannot 
take place in the absence of freehold title is not 
persuasive. 
Traditional rural social relations based on 
reciprocity and interdependence, which pro-
vide households with flexibility, also support 
the maintenance of the traditional tenure 
system. P. Peters has observed that 
All but a tiny minority are engaged in 
complex networks of ties, often based on 
cattle exchanges, with a range of other 
... families. It is through such ties that 
they acquire labor for herding and for crop 
production, services, political support, fa-
vors, help and so forth. Such dense net-
works of dependence and interdependence 
represent social relations of production that 
effectively inhibit, for now, the thrust 
toward ... exclusionary ranching prac-
tices. "17 
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons 
argument holds that communal land tenure 
leads inevitably to environmental degrada-
tion. 1S But privatization in Botswana has been 
associated with environmental degradation 
and has, in some cases, been the cause of 
degradation resulting from land shortages 
created by the alienation of communally held 
land. For example, the worst environmental 
degradation (both overgrazing and sheet and 
gully erosion) in Botswana is generally consid-
ered to be in Northeast District where the 
Ndebele chief Lobengula granted a concession 
over all minerals in a 6000 square kilometer 
(2316 square mile) area to a European mining 
company. The terms of the concession contin-
ued to be broadened until the T ati Company 
obtained freehold ownership of the land in 
1911.19 The result of the concession was the 
crowding of the former inhabitants of the land 
and their livestock onto 344 square miles of 
"Native Reserves." This area, only 15 percent 
of their former holdings, was grossly inade-
quate for the size of the population and, as a 
result, the environment rapidly deteriorated. 20 
Privatization in this case created conditions of 
land scarcity under which no land tenure 
system could have prevented degradation. 
The implicit argument of those who press 
for privatization is that management tech-
niques can be substituted for flexibility. But 
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privatization does not necessarily create the 
conditions of good management. Many private 
farms are themselves not well managed and are 
the sites of considerable erosion. 21 Some ranch-
es established on the principle that private 
land is best have had adverse ecological and 
social effects. 22 The establishment of private 
ranches has not succeeded in stopping over-
grazing because of the amount of the invest-
ment required for good management on these 
relatively small pieces of land and the lack of 
government enforcement of either good man-
agement or stocking limits.21 Further, in a 
perversion of the use of communal land as a 
means to flexibility, private ranch owners may 
graze their animals on communal lands in 
order to reduce the pressure on their private 
holding.24 
To be sure, there is degradation associated 
with communal land tenure in Botswana. But 
even here, available data suggest comparative-
ly less overgrazing in some communal areas. 
The point is that privatization has not proven 
to be uniformly effective in controlling over-
grazing. And, even given existing levels of 
overgrazing on communal land, the specter of 
dispossession that privatization raises has 
made it the less desirable of the two options for 
many Batswana. 
CUSTOMARY WATER LAW AND 
WATER USE PATTERNS 
Water is the sine qua non of survival in a 
semiarid climate. Because it is crucial in 
providing access to other resources (in this case 
grazing and arable land), the rules governing 
access to and use of water will affect other 
institutional arrangements. 
Customary water law in Botswana is simi-
lar to that of other arid and semiarid regions. 25 
Typically, naturally flowing water and natural-
ly occurring surface water are common prop-
erty resources. Travelers and their herds and 
those who need water for domestic uses 
generally have the right, upon seeking permis-
sion, to use any water source. These rights may 
be attached to obligations to assist in the 
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maintenance of the water point. Such rules are 
consistent with the adaptive principle of 
maximizing flexibility, ensuring that a house-
hold will have access to water should it be 
forced to move. 
The investment of either labor or capital in 
the development of a water point creates 
private rights to its use. (Sometimes the point 
is made in customary law that it is the 
structure and not the water which is privately 
held.)16 Thus, dams, haffirs, wells, and bore-
holes can only be used with the permission of 
the owner, although she or he is subject to the 
norm about providing water for travelers and 
domestic use. This regulation of water use is 
important because it can limit pressure on 
grazing. Unless there is open-access water 
nearby, the range in the vicinity of a private 
water point will be grazed only by the cattle of 
the owner and of those who have permission 
to use the water point. This rule is further 
enforced by the common understanding that 
the owner of a borehole has priority over 
grazing within an eight kilometer radius 
around it. Indeed, it is increasingly felt that the 
surrounding land is allocated along with the 
right to drill the borehole. This understanding 
has furthered the development of water points 
as a means of controlling land. 
Because private rights to water sources 
create de facto private rights over the sur-
rounding land, we can judge the relative effects 
of private and communal land tenure by 
comparing the grazing around private and 
communal water points. L. Fortmann and E. 
Roe measured range conditions at four points 
along grazing transects around 21 group- or 
government-owned (both of which were in 
these cases de facto communally owned) water 
points and 22 privately owned water points in 
the eastern communal areas.27 While the areas 
around both sets of water points were in poor 
overall range condition, the range around the 
communal water points was measured as being 
significantly better than that around the 
private water points. That is, de facto private 
control of the land did not appear to have the 
beneficial environmental effects claimed for it. 
Indeed, quite the contrary was true. 
These results are not explained by the type 
of water point associated with private and 
communal ownership. There were no signifi-
cant differences in the state of the range 
around different types of water points (wells, 
boreholes, dams, etc.)28 Rather, the explana-
tion would seem to lie in the flexibility of the 
customary pattern of water use that involves 
moving to where the water (and other re-
sources) are. Communal water points in rural 
Botswana are used in a fallback system. Each 
year as the rains start, households move out to 
the lands areas where seasonal water sources 
are filled by the rains and then fall back to 
more reliable groundwater sources and even-
tually back to the village as the seasonal 
sources go dry. This system creates rotational 
grazing that relieves pressure on the range. 
Private sources, in contrast, tend to be used 
year-round and the grazing thus gets no relief. 
The danger of being locked by private property 
into an inflexible pattern of resource use that is 
inappropriate for the climate is apparent in 
this example. 
Flexibility is furthered by customary water 
law, which preserves certain sources as com-
mon property and establishes the right of 
certain categories of users to water even from 
private water sources. The traditional use 
pattern utilizes resources as they are available 
and preserves certain sources for times of 
stress. Thus, both customary water law and 
the traditional system of water use can be seen 
as adaptations to the semiarid climate. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of substituting 
capital for rainfall has led to changes in the 
pattern of water use. New water sources 
provided by the government, particularly the 
boreholes, have reduced the necessity of 
moving to find water. Moreover, since it is 
possible to transport large quantities of water, 
people do not necessarily have to move now 
even in drought or when the boreholes go dry. 
Yet the effect of this technology is limited 
because it can overcome the effects of weather 
but not necessarily those of climate, and it 
introduces a new kind of uncertainty in the 
form of mechanical failure. Even the deepest 
borehole may go dry or suffer an engine 
breakdown. 29 Therefore, many private water 
point owners still must maintain reciprocity 
with their neighbors in the event they may 
need to use other private or communal water 
points in the future. It is this need for 
reciprocity (which might also be viewed as the 
need for the substitution of social organization 
for rainfall) that is probably the major force for 
equity in the system. 
MULTIPLE RESIDENCES AND 
SHIITING SETTLEMENTS 
Various Tswana peoples have lived in the 
area now known as Botswana for many 
centuries. For much of this time they have 
lived in large settlements reported by aston-
ished European travelers as early as 1804. 10 For 
example, in 1906 the village of Serowe had an 
estimated population of 22,000. However, as 
noted above, farming was done at separate, 
smaller, seasonal settlements. This pattern of 
multiple settlements was dictated by climate 
and soils. The Agricultural and Economic 
advisor to the 1933 Pim Commission com-
mented: 
The climate being a dry one, land suitable 
for cultivation is not always easy to find-
the best is undoubtedly in the lower lying 
places. The present tribal organization 
which consists of the consolidation of the 
population into large villages ... has en-
abled the tribes to select the best situated 
areas for tillage purposes. Scattered cultiva-
tion with the individual owner living on the 
soil with his arable holdings and grazing 
immediately around him would be unsuit-
able for the greater part of the Native 
Reserves, owing to this difficulty of obtain-
ing arable land suitably situated for each 
holding. It would increase denudation and 
might eventually turn the country into a 
wilderness. The consolidation of holdings 
has, on the other hand, permitted a real 
choice of sites for crop-raising and it's quite 
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a noticeable feature in the Reserves that the 
best lands have been selected for this 
purpose. ll 
The pattern of multiple residences has been 
in a process of change for many years. At one 
time it seems that nearly the entire population 
moved to the lands during the farming season, 
returning to the village after harvest. But by 
1943 1. Schapera was reporting Chief Ba-
thoen's negative views of those who at that 
time were remaining year-round at the lands.12 
In more recent times additional households 
have taken up permanent residence at the 
lands. For example, some 22 percent of the 
respondents in a large-scale 1980 survey said 
they lived there permanently." 
This change can be explained only in part 
by the water technology that can make water 
available year-round at the lands. For even in 
lands areas served by boreholes and with such 
social amenities as schools and health posts, 
some households continue to come and go 
with the seasons. In other lands areas with 
extremely inconvenient dry season water 
sources yet other households soldier on at a 
permanent lands residence. 
Admittedly, there has been more change in 
this form of social organization than in land 
tenure or the system of water rights and use. 
But this change must be judged in the light of 
three factors. First, three out of four house-
holds still move every year. Under the system 
of multiple residences, the village was the locus 
of civic and ceremonial activities. This role, 
which the village retains to the present day, 
tends to draw people back into the villages. 
Second, choice of residence can be distin-
guished from systems of property rights in that 
it has become an individual, not a societal, 
decision. A family's decision to maintain a 
single residence at the lands does not interfere 
with the flexibility of other households as 
would a change in the land tenure or water 
rights systems. Third, it is a rescindable 
decision. Should water technology prove to be 
unreliable or excessively expensive, permanent 
lands residents may once again establish a 
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village residence. Thus, a household's relin-
quishing flexibility of residence is not itself an 
inflexible act; flexibility can be resumed at any 
time. 
VILLAGE LEVEL 
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS 
From the arrival of the first European, 
there has been a proliferation of western social 
organizations, starting with the church. Now 
nearly every village in Botswana is awash with 
Parent Teacher Associations, Village Devel-
opment Committees, Village Health Commit-
tees, Social Welfare Committees, Burial 
Societies, Farmers Committees, dam groups, 
small stock groups, dosing groups, carvers' 
groups, basket making groups, the Red Cross, 
Youth Associations, and several kinds of 
women's clubs. Some of these are defunct or 
moribund; others are small, weak, and of 
limited duration. Indeed, some existed in the 
first place only because villagers were too polite 
to tell their initiators to go away. The groups 
that survive are interesting because they have 
been adapted to local conditions, often in ways 
which lead those familiar with their western 
prototype to conclude that they, too, are 
defunct. 
In contrast to exclusionary western organi-
zational forms, traditional local organization 
in Botswana has often been calculatedly recip-
rocal. J4 Further, traditional organizations have 
not necessarily followed the western pattern of 
year-round formal meetings. Among the myri-
ad village-level nontraditional organizations, 
perhaps the most illustrative of the complexi-
ties of their organizational adaptation are the 
dam groupS.35 These were initiated by the 
government as a part of its program of 
providing dams for livestock watering at the 
lands. Each group was to be given exclusive 
rights to use the dam in return for their 
agreement to maintain the dam and restrict its 
use to 400 head. 
The expatriate originators of the dam 
group project were accustomed to sedentary 
communities with a reasonably fixed popula-
tion and private rights to land and water. The 
communities in which the dam groups were to 
be established were seasonal ones with com-
munal rights to land and many water sources 
and, in certain cases, de facto rights to use 
even private water sources based on reciprocal 
networks of rights and obligations. 
Not surprisingly, the dam groups did not 
function in the way their originators antic-
ipated. First, they did not function regularly or 
year-round. Rather, they were seasonal, not 
just because residence in the communities was 
seasonal but because the need for their func-
tioning was restricted to the limited period of 
the year after ephemeral surface water sources 
have gone dry and before most people have left 
the lands area for the village. Nor did these 
groups have expressive functions. Social action 
in Botswana is generally located in kin, 
residential, neighborly, and patronage 
relationships, not in clubs or similar organiza-
tions. Hence, when the dam groups had no 
instrumental function to perform, they were 
allowed to lapse. When it came time for fences 
to be repaired and dam regulations to be 
enforced, the dam groups became active. To 
those accustomed to regular, solemn, and 
formal meetings this perfectly rational seasonal 
strategy appeared to be the sign of a defunct 
organization. 
Although dam groups provide a particular-
ly clear example, various forms of seasonal 
adaptation are typical of village-level organiza-
tions in Botswana. 16 Thus, we find flexible, 
seasonal social structures based on reciprocity 
and adapted to the difficulties of living in this 
semiarid climate overwhelming the demands of 
more rigid alien organizational forms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Social structures in Botswana have histori-
cally been adapted to the vagaries and stresses 
of the semiarid climate, as can be seen in the 
land tenure system, the system of customary 
water use and law, the system of multiple 
residences, and the seasonal nature of many 
village-level organizations. These social struc-
tures have shown remarkable staying power in 
the face of heavy pressures for economic and 
political change since Independence. This is 
particularly true of the systems of land tenure 
and water rights that have persisted in spite of 
national policy changes that, if successfully 
implemented, would have affected rural house-
holds' flexibility and undermined the societal 
value of equity. Note that this sort of flexibility 
is necessary only for agricultural and livestock 
production systems. Were the economic sys-
tem to swing to, say, total dependence on 
diamond revenues, much of the rationale for 
the land and water rights systems would 
collapse. 
Although changes have occurred in the 
substitution of permanent residence at the 
lands for the system of multiple residences, 
these changes have taken the form of individu-
al decisions that do not affect the flexibility of 
others and that affect equity only insofar as 
those who live permanently at the lands are 
able to farm more productively. 
Finally, let us return to the conventional 
wisdom that, while climate does affect social 
organization in a semiarid environment, its 
effect is mediated by a variety of social, 
political, and economic structures. It has been 
argued here that equal consideration should be 
given to the fact that a variety of political and 
economic changes may only slightly alter 
social structure if a need for flexibility in a 
semiarid environment persists. We have seen 
that maintaining flexibility is the keystone of 
adaptation in Botswana and that major shifts 
in the social structure which weaken flexibility 
are unlikely to occur unless the economic base 
changes. Nor are changes that maintain flexi-
bility but that significantly undermine basic 
societal equity likely to occur. In sum, adapta-
tion to a particularly difficult climate would 
seem in part to explain the stability of partic-
ular organizational forms in Botswana. 
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